[1]武利琴,徐勇,王金环,等.基于半张量积的企业创新网络演化博弈[J].智能系统学报,2018,13(5):776-782.[doi:10.11992/tis.201706064]
WU Liqin,XU Yong,WANG Jinhuan,et al.Evolutionary enterprise innovation networked game based on the semi-tensor product of matrices[J].CAAI Transactions on Intelligent Systems,2018,13(5):776-782.[doi:10.11992/tis.201706064]
点击复制
《智能系统学报》[ISSN 1673-4785/CN 23-1538/TP] 卷:
13
期数:
2018年第5期
页码:
776-782
栏目:
学术论文—智能系统
出版日期:
2018-09-05
- Title:
-
Evolutionary enterprise innovation networked game based on the semi-tensor product of matrices
- 作者:
-
武利琴1, 徐勇1, 王金环1, 李杰2
-
1. 河北工业大学 理学院, 天津 300401;
2. 河北工业大学 经济管理学院, 天津 300401
- Author(s):
-
WU Liqin1, XU Yong1, WANG Jinhuan1, LI Jie2
-
1. School of Sciences, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, China
-
- 关键词:
-
企业创新; 半张量积; 创新网络; 演化博弈; 纳什均衡; 政府调控; 智猪博弈; 策略局势
- Keywords:
-
enterprise innovation; semi-tensor product; innovation networks; evolutionary game; Nash equilibrium; government regulation; Boxed Pig game; strategy profile
- 分类号:
-
F270;TP18
- DOI:
-
10.11992/tis.201706064
- 摘要:
-
当代经济环境下,创新已经成为企业生存发展的必要条件。将所有企业按规模分为大小两种企业,建立企业创新双层耦合网络,并研究了企业间的博弈过程。首先,运用矩阵半张量积方法,以“智猪博弈”为基本博弈,得到每一时刻各企业的策略,而非企业总体创新的比例;其次,根据收益函数得到整个企业创新网络的最优稳定纳什均衡点;最后,增加政府调控,改变博弈基本支付矩阵,从而达到最优稳定纳什均衡状态,即所有企业全部创新。
- Abstract:
-
In the contemporary economic environment, innovation has become the inevitable condition for the survival and development of enterprises. In this paper, all the enterprises were classified into two categories according to the scale, establishing a double-layer coupling network of enterprise innovation, and the process of the game between enterprises was studied. Firstly, taking "Boxed Pig Game" as the basic game, the semi-tensor product method was used to get the strategy of each enterprise at every moment, not the proportion of the enterprise overall innovation. Secondly, the optimal stability for the Nash equilibrium of the whole enterprise innovation network was reached according to the payoff function. Finally, the government regulation was introduced to change the basic matrix of the game and therefore reach a stable state of the optimal Nash equilibrium; that is, all enterprises realized innovation all round.
备注/Memo
收稿日期:2017-06-19。
基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目(16FGL014);国家自然科学基金项目(61203142);河北省自然科学基金项目(F2014202206).
作者简介:武利琴,女,1992年生,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为网络演化博弈及应用;徐勇,男,1971年生,教授,博士,主要研究方向为非线性系统控制、图论、复杂网络控制与优化。参加或主持省部级科研项目10余项,发表学术论文30余篇,被EI检索10余篇;王金环,女,1980年生,副教授,博士,主要研究方向为多智能体系统协同控制、网络演化博弈。主持国家级、省部级科研项目4项,发表学术论文30余篇,被SCI和EI收录30余篇。
通讯作者:徐勇.E-mail:xuyong@hebut.edu.cn.
更新日期/Last Update:
2018-10-25