[1]曲卫华,颜志军.企业、政府与公众公共健康提升激励机制演化分析[J].智能系统学报,2017,12(02):237-243.[doi:10.11992/tis.201508012]
 QU Weihua,YAN Zhijun.Evolutionary analysis of incentive mechanisms for enterprises, governments, and the public to achieve environmental health improvements[J].CAAI Transactions on Intelligent Systems,2017,12(02):237-243.[doi:10.11992/tis.201508012]
点击复制

企业、政府与公众公共健康提升激励机制演化分析(/HTML)
分享到:

《智能系统学报》[ISSN:1673-4785/CN:23-1538/TP]

卷:
第12卷
期数:
2017年02期
页码:
237-243
栏目:
出版日期:
2017-04-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Evolutionary analysis of incentive mechanisms for enterprises, governments, and the public to achieve environmental health improvements
作者:
曲卫华12 颜志军3
1. 太原学院 计算中心, 山西 太原 030032;
2. 山西大学 管理与决策研究中心, 山西 太原 030006;
3. 北京理工大学 管理与经济学院, 北京 100081
Author(s):
QU Weihua12 YAN Zhijun3
1. Computer Center, Taiyuan University, Taiyuan 030032, China;
2. Institute of Management and Decision, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China;
3. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China
关键词:
能源消费企业污染政府监管公众参与博弈
Keywords:
energy consumptionenterprise pollutiongovernment regulationpublic participationgame theory
分类号:
TP3;062.2;C93
DOI:
10.11992/tis.201508012
摘要:
我国能源消费导致的环境污染严重影响公众的公共健康水平。在考虑公众公共健康损失赔偿的情况下,构建了企业、政府与公众的三方演化博弈模型以分析三方策略的选择机制及影响因素。演化博弈理论认为在三维空间区域内,三方没有收敛于某一结果的演化稳定策略。研究发现,在一定条件下,在三维空间的某一区域内,三方可收敛到理想的演化博弈稳定策略:{实行能源转型、企业监管、公众参与环境管理}。并用数值仿真展示了在理想演化博弈稳定策略情景下,不同政策决策参数对演化结果的影响。研究结果表明,在政府群体实行监管比例固定的条件下,公众群体参与环境管理比例越大或公众公共健康损失赔偿越大,企业群体演化与实行能源转型策略的速度越快。同时,讨论了政府补贴、税收减免、政府罚款对演化结果的影响,提出了相应的政策建议。
Abstract:
The effects environmental pollution caused by energy consumption are having on public health in China are quickly becoming increasingly serious. In this paper, we establish an evolutionary game model for enterprises, governments, and the public to analyze selection mechanisms and impact factors of these three constituents, thus considering health damage compensation. From game theory, these three stakeholders fail to converge to an ideal evolutionary stable strategy in some domains of the given three-dimensional space; however, we have found that, under certain conditions, these three stakeholders can converge to an ideal evolutionary stable strategy in certain domains, i.e., implementing energy transformation, enterprise regulation, and public participation in environment control. We show the effects that the variety of decision-making parameters have on evolutionary results via numerical experiments. We found that when the proportion of influence that the government group exercises in terms of regulations remains fixed, the higher the proportion of public participation in environmental management (and therefore higher health damage compensation) and the faster the speed by which the enterprise group evolves and energy transformation is realized. We also discuss the effects that government subsidies, tax deductions and exemptions, and government fines have on the evolutionary results, making some suggestions for policymakers as part of our conclusions.

参考文献/References:

[1] KAN Haidong, CHEN Renjie, TONG Shilu. Ambient air pollution, climate change, and population health in China[J]. Environment international, 2012, 42: 10-19.
[2] 穆泉, 张世秋. 2013年1月中国大面积雾霾事件直接社会经济损失评估[J]. 中国环境科学, 2013, 33(11): 2087-2094. MU Quan, ZHANG Shiqiu. An evaluation of the economic loss due to the heavy haze during January 2013 in China[J]. China environmental science, 2013, 33(11): 2087-2094.
[3] XIA Yang, GUAN Dabo, JIANG Xujia, et al. Assessment of socioeconomic costs to China’s air pollution[J]. Atmospheric environment, 2016, 139: 147-156.
[4] WANG Yu. The analysis of the impacts of energy consumption on environment and public health in China[J]. Energy, 2010, 35(11): 4473-4479.
[5] ZHANG Xiaohong, ZHANG Rong, WU Liqian, et al. The interactions among China’s economic growth and its energy consumption and emissions during 1978-2007[J]. Ecological indicators, 2013, 24: 83-95.
[6] 曲卫华, 颜志军. 能源消费对环境与公共健康的影响——基于山西省的实证分析[J]. 北京理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2014, 16(4): 33-41. QU Weihua, YAN Zhijun. Impact of energy consumption on environment and public health: empirical evidence from Shanxi province[J]. Journal of Beijing institute of technology (social sciences edition), 2014, 16(4): 33-41.
[7] DONG Xiaoqing, LI Chaolin, LI Ji, et al. A game-theoretic analysis of implementation of cleaner production policies in the Chinese electroplating industry[J]. Resources, conservation and recycling, 2010, 54(12): 1442-1448.
[8] 许士春, 何正霞, 龙如银. 环境政策工具比较: 基于企业减排的视角[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2012, 32(11): 2351-2362. XU Shichun, HE Zhengxia, LONG Ruyin. Comparative research on environmental policy instruments: enterprise emission abatement perspective[J]. Systems engineering - theory & practice, 2012, 32(11): 2351-2362.
[9] 郭丕斌, 周喜君, 李丹, 等. 煤炭资源型经济转型的困境与出路: 基于能源技术创新视角的分析[J]. 中国软科学, 2013(7): 39-46. GUO Pibin, ZHOU Xijun, LI Dan, et al. Predicament and its solution in the transformation of coal resource based economy: a perspective of energy technology innovation[J]. China soft science, 2013(7): 39-46.
[10] ZHENG Siqi, KAHN M E, SUN Weizeng, et al. Incentives for China’s urban mayors to mitigate pollution externalities: the role of the central government and public environmentalism[J]. Regional science and urban economics, 2014, 47: 61-71.
[11] LI Li, WANG Jianjun, TAN Zhongfu, et al. Policies for eliminating low-efficiency production capacities and improving energy efficiency of energy-intensive industries in China[J]. Renewable and sustainable energy reviews, 2014, 39: 312-326.
[12] 张国兴, 张绪涛, 汪应洛, 等. 节能减排政府补贴的最优边界问题研究[J]. 管理科学学报, 2014, 17(11): 129-138. ZHANG Guoxing, ZHANG Xutao, WANG Yingluo, et al. Analysis of optimal boundary of government subsidies for energy conservation and emission reduction[J]. Journal of management sciences in China, 2014, 17(11): 129-138.
[13] GERA W. Public participation in environmental governance in the Philippines: the challenge of consolidation in engaging the state[J]. Land use policy, 2016, 52: 501-510.
[14] 朱庆华, 窦一杰. 基于政府补贴分析的绿色供应链管理博弈模型[J]. 管理科学学报, 2011, 14(6): 86-95. ZHU Qinghua, DOU Yijie. A game model for green supply chain management based on government subsidies[J]. Journal of management sciences in China, 2011, 14(6): 86-95.
[15] KALDELLIS J K, KAPSALI M, KATSANOU E. Renewable energy applications in Greece—What is the public attitude?[J]. Energy policy, 2012, 42: 37-48.
[16] KALDELLIS J K, KAPSALI M, KALDELLI E, et al. Comparing recent views of public attitude on wind energy, photovoltaic and small hydro applications[J]. Renewable energy, 2013, 52: 197-208.
[17] 杜建国, 王敏, 陈晓燕, 等. 公众参与下的企业环境行为演化研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2013, 22(1): 244-251. DU Jianguo, WANG Min, CHEN Xiaoyan, et al. Study on evolution of enterprise’s environmental behavior under public participation[J]. Operations research and management science, 2013, 22(1): 244-251.
[18] 郑思齐, 万广华, 孙伟增, 等. 公众诉求与城市环境治理[J]. 管理世界, 2013(6): 72-84.
[19] SCATà M, DI STEFANO A, LA CORTE A, et al. Combining evolutionary game theory and network theory to analyze human cooperation patterns[J]. Chaos, solitons & fractals, 2016, 91: 17-24.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2015-8-13;改回日期:。
基金项目:北京市自然科学基金项目(9152015).
作者简介:曲卫华,男,1982年生,副教授,博士。主要研究方向为能源环境经济、健康经济、健康大数据分析与复杂系统建模。发表学术论文15篇。被SCI/SSCI论文检索2篇,被EI检索1篇,被CSSCI、CSCD检索5篇;颜志军,男,1974年生,教授,博导,博士,主要研究方向为电子商务、健康管理、医疗大数据分析、社会网络分析。先后主持和参与国家自然科学基金、科技部、“973”课题、“863”课题、"十五"科技攻关专题、国防科工委"十一五"基础科研"等重要科研课题20余项。发表学术论文70余篇,其中被SCI/SSCI/EI检索论文20余篇。
通讯作者:颜志军. E-mail:yanzhijun@bit.edu.cn.
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01